Deterrence Dynamics
Much of my work examines deterrence dynamics, including extended and direct deterrence.
My book manuscript examines the practice of extended deterrence, or how major powers protect their allies by extending the deterrent effects of their military power. In particular, the work explains how major powers practice extended deterrence, the conditions under which major powers use which practice, and the relative effectiveness of each framework in achieving the major powers’ strategic goals.
Past work on extended deterrence has failed to recognize the significant variation in how states practice extended deterrence by treating all extended deterrence practices the same, ignoring significant variation in the extended deterrence tools states use. This is particularly important given that different tools present different costs and benefits, states use these tools as complements and substitutes, and states confront tradeoffs between their extended deterrence goals. My book project addresses these issues in several ways.
First, drawing on the signaling and deterrence literatures, I develop a novel typology of the frameworks that major countries, such as the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, use to signal their commitments to deter and defeat attacks on their allies. By identifying how these countries use treaties, troops, and nukes to signal extended deterrence commitments, the typology brings coherence to our understanding of extended deterrence practices and shows how they systematically vary across both time and space.
Second, using large-N analysis, I evaluate the relative success of each framework in achieving various – and, at times, conflicting – strategic goals of the major power, such as deterring the adversary, reassuring the junior ally, and restraining the junior ally. The results indicate that major powers face tradeoffs in pursuing their extended deterrence goals and that simultaneously accomplishing multiple strategic goals will require the selection of more costly extended deterrence frameworks. I am also developing a follow-on survey experiment to highlight how these dynamics play out at the individual level.
Third, I develop a theory explaining under what conditions major powers will resort to which of the frameworks in the typology. I argue that the presence of a given extended deterrence framework between a senior and junior ally is largely driven by a strategic-choice process. I then test my theory using both a pattern-matching exercise against the universe of post-WWII extended deterrence cases and qualitative case studies examining the extended deterrence relationships between the United States and South Korea, the United States and Italy, the United States and Taiwan, the Soviet Union and Mongolia, and the United Kingdom and Belize. Throughout, I utilize extensive archival, primary, and secondary source research conducted in English, Chinese, Italian, and Russian, drawing heavily on intelligence estimates and records of diplomatic negotiations.
In a separate co-authored working paper with Terry Roehrig, we examine the state of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. We review the core elements of deterrence theory, apply them to the Korean Peninsula, and argue that deterrence on the Peninsula is stronger than sometimes believed.
Much of my work examines deterrence dynamics, including extended and direct deterrence.
My book manuscript examines the practice of extended deterrence, or how major powers protect their allies by extending the deterrent effects of their military power. In particular, the work explains how major powers practice extended deterrence, the conditions under which major powers use which practice, and the relative effectiveness of each framework in achieving the major powers’ strategic goals.
Past work on extended deterrence has failed to recognize the significant variation in how states practice extended deterrence by treating all extended deterrence practices the same, ignoring significant variation in the extended deterrence tools states use. This is particularly important given that different tools present different costs and benefits, states use these tools as complements and substitutes, and states confront tradeoffs between their extended deterrence goals. My book project addresses these issues in several ways.
First, drawing on the signaling and deterrence literatures, I develop a novel typology of the frameworks that major countries, such as the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, use to signal their commitments to deter and defeat attacks on their allies. By identifying how these countries use treaties, troops, and nukes to signal extended deterrence commitments, the typology brings coherence to our understanding of extended deterrence practices and shows how they systematically vary across both time and space.
Second, using large-N analysis, I evaluate the relative success of each framework in achieving various – and, at times, conflicting – strategic goals of the major power, such as deterring the adversary, reassuring the junior ally, and restraining the junior ally. The results indicate that major powers face tradeoffs in pursuing their extended deterrence goals and that simultaneously accomplishing multiple strategic goals will require the selection of more costly extended deterrence frameworks. I am also developing a follow-on survey experiment to highlight how these dynamics play out at the individual level.
Third, I develop a theory explaining under what conditions major powers will resort to which of the frameworks in the typology. I argue that the presence of a given extended deterrence framework between a senior and junior ally is largely driven by a strategic-choice process. I then test my theory using both a pattern-matching exercise against the universe of post-WWII extended deterrence cases and qualitative case studies examining the extended deterrence relationships between the United States and South Korea, the United States and Italy, the United States and Taiwan, the Soviet Union and Mongolia, and the United Kingdom and Belize. Throughout, I utilize extensive archival, primary, and secondary source research conducted in English, Chinese, Italian, and Russian, drawing heavily on intelligence estimates and records of diplomatic negotiations.
In a separate co-authored working paper with Terry Roehrig, we examine the state of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. We review the core elements of deterrence theory, apply them to the Korean Peninsula, and argue that deterrence on the Peninsula is stronger than sometimes believed.