Chinese Foreign Policy
I have several projects examining aspects of Chinese foreign policy. In my work in this area, I draw heavily on primary source research and expert interviews.
My co-authored correspondence (with Robert C. Watts IV) published in International Security argues that China's influence in overseas ports does not provide a significant power projection capability, particularly during wartime.
In addition, I have published extensively on China's nuclear weapons program and missile forces. In a recent co-authored peer-reviewed monograph published through National Defense University Press, Phil Saunders and I develop a framework for evaluating the drivers of China's nuclear force development. In an article in the Nonproliferation Review, I use technical assessments of China’s nuclear weapons program to evaluate claims about a possible Chinese nuclear breakout, drawing on a wide array of original primary source data. In a separate article published in Asian Security, I develop a leadership model of organizational analysis which can help illuminate the organizational priorities, future trajectory, and its personnel management practices of opaque state institutions. Using this model and a novel dataset on the career paths of Chinese military officers, I shed new light on the inner workings of China’s missile forces. In a book chapter published through Georgetown University Press and co-authored with Phil Saunders, we review recent developments in China’s strategic forces, including the role of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, counter-space systems, ballistic missile defenses, hypersonic weapons, and offensive cyber capabilities.
In addition to these published works, I have a co-authored working paper with Meir Alkon examining diversionary conflict dynamics in China invited to R&R at International Studies Quarterly. Adverse domestic conditions are widely believed to encourage international aggression and heightened risks of conflict. However, the mechanisms undergirding this relationship between domestic conditions and foreign policy remain unspecified and untested. In our project, we develop a theoretical framework that distinguishes alternative mechanisms to understand the possible interactions between domestic conditions and foreign policy preferences and test these mechanisms in the theoretically and empirically relevant context of contemporary China. We use a rich multimedia design embedded in a survey experiment of nearly 3,000 Chinese nationals. Our results cast doubt on the assumed micro-foundations of traditional models linking domestic conditions with foreign policy preferences.
I also have a working paper examining Chinese views of strategic stability and their implications for China's nuclear force development, U.S.-China relations, and the prospects for arms control involving China. Based on an extensive analysis of Chinese-language sources published since the start of China's recent nuclear buildup, I find that Chinese writings identify four pillars of strategic stability: mutual nuclear vulnerability, the overall state of bilateral relations, the nuclear taboo, and beliefs about the controllability of nuclear escalation. Chinese strategists perceive each of these four pillars as eroding, in part due to U.S. actions.
Finally, I am also currently preparing a working paper examining the factors influencing China's willingness to use military force in an attempt to take Taiwan. This includes an extensive review of the views of the Chinese strategic community of factors such as the local conventional military balance, political dynamics in Taiwan, U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific, and U.S.-China relations.
I have several projects examining aspects of Chinese foreign policy. In my work in this area, I draw heavily on primary source research and expert interviews.
My co-authored correspondence (with Robert C. Watts IV) published in International Security argues that China's influence in overseas ports does not provide a significant power projection capability, particularly during wartime.
In addition, I have published extensively on China's nuclear weapons program and missile forces. In a recent co-authored peer-reviewed monograph published through National Defense University Press, Phil Saunders and I develop a framework for evaluating the drivers of China's nuclear force development. In an article in the Nonproliferation Review, I use technical assessments of China’s nuclear weapons program to evaluate claims about a possible Chinese nuclear breakout, drawing on a wide array of original primary source data. In a separate article published in Asian Security, I develop a leadership model of organizational analysis which can help illuminate the organizational priorities, future trajectory, and its personnel management practices of opaque state institutions. Using this model and a novel dataset on the career paths of Chinese military officers, I shed new light on the inner workings of China’s missile forces. In a book chapter published through Georgetown University Press and co-authored with Phil Saunders, we review recent developments in China’s strategic forces, including the role of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, counter-space systems, ballistic missile defenses, hypersonic weapons, and offensive cyber capabilities.
In addition to these published works, I have a co-authored working paper with Meir Alkon examining diversionary conflict dynamics in China invited to R&R at International Studies Quarterly. Adverse domestic conditions are widely believed to encourage international aggression and heightened risks of conflict. However, the mechanisms undergirding this relationship between domestic conditions and foreign policy remain unspecified and untested. In our project, we develop a theoretical framework that distinguishes alternative mechanisms to understand the possible interactions between domestic conditions and foreign policy preferences and test these mechanisms in the theoretically and empirically relevant context of contemporary China. We use a rich multimedia design embedded in a survey experiment of nearly 3,000 Chinese nationals. Our results cast doubt on the assumed micro-foundations of traditional models linking domestic conditions with foreign policy preferences.
I also have a working paper examining Chinese views of strategic stability and their implications for China's nuclear force development, U.S.-China relations, and the prospects for arms control involving China. Based on an extensive analysis of Chinese-language sources published since the start of China's recent nuclear buildup, I find that Chinese writings identify four pillars of strategic stability: mutual nuclear vulnerability, the overall state of bilateral relations, the nuclear taboo, and beliefs about the controllability of nuclear escalation. Chinese strategists perceive each of these four pillars as eroding, in part due to U.S. actions.
Finally, I am also currently preparing a working paper examining the factors influencing China's willingness to use military force in an attempt to take Taiwan. This includes an extensive review of the views of the Chinese strategic community of factors such as the local conventional military balance, political dynamics in Taiwan, U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific, and U.S.-China relations.